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Abstract
AnewUnemployment Insurance System based on individual accountswas launched
in Chile on October 2002. One of the most interesting features of the system is given
by the compensation scheme of the fund manager, which contains a performance-
based incentive benchmarked to one of the default portfolios of the pension system
(pension funds Type E, with a 100% investment in fixed-income securities).
This paper studies the portfolio choice problem of a fundmanager which is subject
to a similar performance-based compensation scheme. We model the portfolio choice
problem of a risk averse portfolio manager that must finance an exogenous sequence
of benefits, and whose terminal payoff depends upon the terminal value of the port-
folio under management, relative to an exogenous benchmark portfolio. Our interest
is on the consequences of the incentive scheme over the portfolio that is selected by
the portfolio manager.
For the Black and Scholes [1973] economywe are able to determine the investment
policy in closed form. We show that the riskiness of the portfolio depends on the
composition of the benchmark, and that the fund manager is motivated to imitate the
investment policy of the benchmark in some random scenarios.
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1 Introduction
A new unemployment insurance (UI) system based on individual accounts was launched
in Chile on October 2002. This new system mandates all workers and employers, en-
gaged in labor relationships started after October 2002, to save a fraction of the worker’s
salary in an individual account on a monthly basis.1 The savings, plus the returns ob-
tained, can be withdrawn from the individual account by the worker in case of unem-
ployment, according to a pre-defined schedule of withdrawals and the balance of the
individual account.2
The collection of contributions, investment management, and the payment of the cor-
responding benefits in this new system has been franchised to a single-purpose firm,
known as the Unemployment Insurance FundManager (UIFM). The monthly revenue of
this firm is based solely on a fee charged over the total funds under management, from
the individual accounts of the workers that were employed during the previous month.
One of the main features of the new system is the presence of a compensation scheme
that contains incentives based on the percentage fee that the UIFM can charge every
month. The incentives are benchmarked against the pension funds that invest only in
fixed-income securities.3 In particular, the compensation scheme establishes an increase
or decrease in the monthly base fee (0.05%) that can go up or down up to 10% when the
UIFM beats or is beaten by the benchmark portfolio. The base of comparison corresponds
to the annualized returns of the last 36 months.
The subject of this paper is to study the portfolio choice implications of the incentives
embedded into this compensation scheme. To this end, we model the portfolio choice
problem of a risk averse portfolio manager that has to pay random benefits during a
given month. We compare the optimal portfolio choice of the manager with the one
1In the case of labor contracts of indefinite duration (i.e., those without a foreseeable horizon), the em-
ployee’s contribution amounts to 0.6% of the salary, while the employer’s contribution amounts to 1.6%.
For the case of fixed duration or by task contracts, the employer’ contribution amounts to 3%, while the
employee contributes nothing. In both cases there is a maximum monthly salary of reference currently set
at $3,000 (US) dollars.
2For the case of indefinite contracts there are additional contributions which are made to a so-called
‘solidarity fund’ by the employer (0.8%) and the Central Government (an amount which is set by law). The
purpose of the solidarity fund is to finance a floor of withdrawals for workers that have been fired and have
contributed at least 12 months.
3The Chilean Pension System based on individual accounts has adopted a life-cycle investment style
based on funds targeted to different age groups. The system currently considers 5 different funds. The
more conservative one (Type E) is only allowed to invest in fixed-income securities; see Ferreiro-Yazigi [9]
for further references.
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that results from a compensation scheme where these incentives are absent. We study
the portfolio choice problem of the fund manager in a Black and Scholes [2] setting and
provide the optimal portfolio policy in closed-form. For this particular environment, we
are able to show that the optimal portfolio of the UIFM replicates the investment policy
of the benchmark portfolio in some states of the world.
The literature on compensation schemes and incentives has been subject to important
contributions during the recent years; see, e.g., Basak et al. [1], Carpenter [3], Goetzmann
et al. [10], Hodder and Jackwerth [11], and Ross [18]. The paper which is closer in
spirit to the present one is the one by Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro [1] that studies the
problem of a fundmanager facing a compensation scheme which is benchmarked against
an exogenous portfolio, and that considers —as we do— the simplified context of the
Black and Scholes setting. Although the basic underlying principles are the same, our
paper considers a concrete compensation scheme that is worth studying. In particular,
the compensation scheme under consideration explicitly considers bonuses and penalties
starting from a base situation, and further, the economic environment faced by the fund
manager is one in which the random payment of benefits is a relevant consideration.
We employ the martingale approach pioneered by Cox and Huang [4] and Karatzas
et al. [13] to study the portfolio choice problem of the UIFM. This approach allows us to
analytically characterize the investment policy that emerges in portfolio choice problems
under very general economic environments.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the model, section 2.1 de-
scribes the economic environment, sections 2.2 and 2.3 analyze the portfolio choice prob-
lem with and without incentives in the compensation scheme, and section 3 provides
some concluding remarks. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The model
This section develops a model that is aimed at capturing the relevant features contained
in the compensation scheme faced by the fund manager in a given month. The main
element of interest corresponds to the fact that fund manager’s revenues are dictated by
the annualized returns obtained by both the fund manager and the benchmark portfolio.
In order to establish a valid point of reference to which compare the effects of the
incentives embedded in the compensation scheme, we first analyze the portfolio choice
problem of the fund manager with a compensation scheme in which such incentives are
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absent.
2.1 Economic environment
(UNCERTAINTY) Time is continuous on a finite horizon [0, T], T > 0. The uncertainty
is generated by a Brownian Motion process, W 2 Rd, d 2 N, defined on a complete,
filtered probability space, (Ω,F ,F = fFtg0tT,P), where P denotes the probability
measure defined over (Ω,F ). Given that our interest is placed on the characterization of
the situation of interest, in what follows we will point out only the most relevant techni-
cal conditions, and will assume that all processes to be introduced are well-defined. In
particular, all processes to appear have a strong solution, and all expressions containing
(in)equalities of random variables will be understood in the almost sure sense; that is, for
any two given random variables x(ω), y(ω) : Ω 7! R, the expression x > y is to be
understood in the sense that P(x > y) = 1.
(CONSUMPTION SPACE) In the economy under analysis there is a single perishable con-
sumption good that will be taken as the nummeraire. The consumption space is given
by consumption bundles c  fct  0g0tT that have the property of being integrable.4
(PREFERENCES) Fundmanager’s preferences are represented by a von NeumannMorgen-
stern index defined over the terminal value of the Unemployment Fund, FT  0, of the
form: V(FT) , E0 [u(φ (FT))], where Et [] , E [ j Ft], 8t 2 [0, T], corresponds to the
mathematical expectation at time t, conditional on the information available at that time
(Ft), φ() : R+ 7! (0, 1) denotes the compensation scheme of the fund manager which is
a function of FT, and the mapping u() : R+ 7! R is of class C2, with u0() > 0, u00() < 0,
which in addition satisfies Inada endpoint conditions.
(FINANCIAL MARKET) We consider a frictionless financial market where all sources of
uncertainty (generated by W) can be hedged away; that is, we will consider a (dynami-
cally) complete financial market with no transaction costs, and where the fund manager
can rebalance its portfolio continuously; see Merton [14]. In particular, we will consider
a financial market comprised of d + 1 assets, represented by d (locally) risky securities
(S  fSig1id), and a (locally) riskless money-market account (B),5 which dynamics is
4A process x is called p-integrable if P(
R T
0 x
p
t dt < ∞) = 1. If p = 1 the process if called integrable.
5In an economic environment where the instantaneous interest rate is a function of the trajectories ofW,
the price of a long-term bond with maturity T is “locally” risky (i.e., between t and t+ dt, the change in
the price of the long-term bond depends on dW).
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dictated by the following system:
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1
dSt + δtdt = IS (µtdt+ σtdWt) , S0 2 Rd++ given,
where IS denotes a diagonal matrix of dimension d, that contains the price of each risky
security on its diagonal, and the quantities
(r, µ, δ, σ)  f(rt, µt, δt, σt) 2 R+ Rd+ Rd+ Rdd/f0gg0tT
are functions of the trajectories ofW (or Itô processes) that satisfy the conditions thatmake
B and S integrable processes. They represent, respectively, the instantaneous interest rate,
the expected return of the risky securities, their corresponding dividend, and volatility
matrix.
(WITHDRAWAL OF BENEFITS) The withdrawal of benefits throughout the investment hori-
zon [0, T] is represented by an F-adapted process, b  fbt 2 [0, b¯)g0tT, 0 < b¯ < K < ∞,
whose dynamics is described by dbt/bt = µbt dt+ σ
b
t dWt, b0 > 0, where (µ
b, σb) are func-
tions of the trajectories ofW, that satisfy the necessary conditions for b to be an integrable
process.
(UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUND) The dynamics of the Unemployment Insurance
Fund, Fpi  fFpit  0g0tT, is generated by the investment plan chosen by the fund
manager. For a given investment plan pi  fpit 2 Rdg0tT, where pi denotes the dollar
amount invested in each of the risky assets, the Unemployment Insurance Fund’s dynam-
ics is represented by the following system6
(1)
(
dFpit = [F
pi
t   pi0t1]rtdt+ pi0t[
 
IS
 1
(dSt + δtdt)]  btdt;
F0 > 0; Fpit  0, 8t 2 [0, T]; FT = FpiT ,
where the symbol “0” denotes transposition, 1 = (1, . . . , 1)0 2 Rd, Fpit   pi0t1 corresponds
to the dollar amount invested in the money-market account (that provides a return of rt),
while the remainder, pi0t1, corresponds to the dollar amount invested in the risky assets
(that provides a return given by capital gains plus dividends, (dSit + δitdt)/Sit, for i =
1, . . . , d).
6The dynamics in (1) implicitly assumes that the fund manager’s revenue is received after T. To assume
the opposite will amount to modify the expression in (2) so that the new terminal value of the UI fund will
be given by FˆT = (1  φ)FT . The analysis that follows remains unchanged by this re-normalization.
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(INVESTMENT PLANS) In what follows, we will denote the set of investment plans that
satisfy the system (1), along with the conditionsV(FT) < ∞ and Fpit integrable, byApi(F0).
An investment plan pi 2 Api(F0) will be called admissible. We will also denote the set of
optimal investment plans by A(F0), where pi 2 A(F0), if and only if, V(FpiT )  V(FpiT ),
8pi 2 Api(F0).
2.2 The portfolio choice problem
We first analyze the portfolio choice problem of the fund manager by considering an
incentive-free compensation scheme given by a constant function φ(FT) = φFT. Under
these circumstances, the fund manager’s problem is given by the selection of an admissi-
ble investment plan pi 2 Api(F0) to maximize the utility index V(FT).
Making use of somewell known results in the literature (Cox andHuang [4, 5], Karatzas
et. al [13]), it is possible to show that an investment plan pi is admissible, if and only if,
the following “static” version of the budget constraint in (1) is satisfied by FT,
(2) E0
Z T
0
ξ0,tbtdt+ ξ0,TFT

 F0,
where
(3) ξs,t , exp

 
Z t
s

rv +
1
2
θ0vθv

dv 
Z t
s
θ0vdWv

,
with θ , σ 1(µ   r1), stand for the stochastic discount factor (SDF), or Arrow-Debreu
state price density of buying at time s a unit of the consumption good to be delivered at
time t 2 [s, T], 0  s  t, which is, in addition, compatible with the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. To simplify the notation we will make use of the following identity ξ0,t 
ξt, 8t 2 [0, T]. Note that equation (2) is simply a condition between the initial value of
the Unemployment Insurance Fund, F0, and the present value of all disbursements.
In order to avoid trivial cases, we will assume that
E0
Z T
0
ξtb¯dt

< F0,
and will impose the following technical condition.
Assumption 1 (Novikov Condition) The processes (µ, r, σ) are such that
E0

exp
Z T
0
θ0tθtdt

< ∞.
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From the static representation of the budget constraint in (2), it is possible to re-state
the fund manager’s problem, this time, in terms of the terminal value of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund, FT, in the following manner:
(P0) max
FT0
V(FT), subject to: E0
Z T
0
ξtbtdt+ ξTFT

 F0.
Problem (P0) is a standard portfolio choice problem (Karatzas and Shreve [12], Ch. 3),
fromwhere we have that the optimal terminal value of the fund, FT , can be obtained from
the first-order conditions, FT  φ 1 J(φ 1yξT), where J() , u0 1() : R++ 7! R++, and
the unique real number y > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for which the static budget
constraint holds with equality.7 The exact value of y is obtained as the unique solution
X (y) = F0, where
(4) X (y) , E0
Z T
0
ξtbtdt+ ξTF

T

.
Once FT has been identified, it is possible to determine the investment plan that fi-
nances the optimal wealth process given by8
Ft = Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds+ ξt,TF

T

.
With regard to this, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 (Ocone and Karatzas [17]) The optimal investment plan of the fund manager,
pi, is given by the expression
pit = σ 1t θtEt

ξt,T
FT
γT

  σ 1t Et

ξt,TF

T

1  1
γT

Ht,T

(5)
+ σ 1t σ
b
tEt
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds

+ σ 1t Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbs(Γt,s   Ht,s)ds

where γT ,  FTu00(FT)/u0(FT) denotes the relative risk aversion coefficient, and the quantities
Ht,s and Γt,s are defined in the Appendix.
7This property follows from the strict monotonocity of u(), while the existence and uniqueness of y >
0, follows from the limits limy"∞ X (y) , X (∞) = E0[
R T
0 ξtbtdt] < F0, limy#0 X (y) , X (0) = ∞ > F0, and
the continuity of X (). For more details, the reader is referred to the Chapter 3 in [12].
8The classical references on this topic are Karatzas and Shreve [12] and Ocone and Karatzas [17]. A
more accesible presentation is provided by Detemple, García and Rindisbacher [7, 8].
7
The expression in (5) uncovers the dependence of the optimal investment plan with
respect to two quantities: the present value (at time t 2 [0, T]) of the desired terminal
value of the fund,
(6) Et

ξt,TF

T

,
and the present value (at time t 2 [0, T]) of the flow of benefits to be paid throughout the
investment horizon,
(7) Et
hR T
t ξt,sbsds
i
.
Regarding the first two components in (5), the optimal investment plan shows that
the investment in risky assets is adjusted by the relative risk aversion of the fund man-
ager. This result is identical to the one obtained by Merton [14, 15] for the case of a
stochastic investment opportunity set. In particular, the optimal investment plan con-
tains a mean-variance component (first term in (5)), and a hedging term that accounts for
the fluctuations in the price of providing the desired terminal values of the fund (second
term in (5)).
The last two components in (5) show that the fund manager should replicate, to some
extent, the movements in the exogenous benefit process (b). On the one hand, the third
component in (5) corresponds to a position that replicates a claim that accounts for the
present value of the benefit process, while on the other hand, the last term represents a
hedging component that accounts for fluctuations in both the price and the amount of
such a claim.
Remark 1 In an economy characterized by a constant investment opportunity set, i.e., where (r,
µ, σ, δ, µb, σb) are all constant, we have that Ht,s = Γt,s = 0. If in addition u() = ln(), it
follows that γT = 1, and therefore the optimal investment plan of the fund manager only considers
the mean-variance efficient portfolio and the claim that replicates the payment of benefits (first and
third terms in (5)).
2.3 The incentives of the compensation scheme
Throughout this section we will introduce additional simplifications in order to analyze
the investment plan of the fund manager in a tractable manner. In particular, we con-
sider the incentives embedded in a compensation scheme by means of an observable
benchmark portfolio, along with the following assumptions:
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A1 the uncertainty is generated by a 1-dimensional Brownianmotion process (i.e., d = 1);
A2 the parameters of the economy, (r, µ, δ, σ, µb, σb) 2 R+ R+ R+ R/f0g, are con-
stant;
A3 the mapping u() is of the CRRA class, with γ > 0.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions (A1)-(A3), we have that the optimal fraction of wealth al-
located in the risky asset, when φ is a constant, is given by
pit
Ft
=
(µ  r)
γσ2
f t +
σb
σ
(1  f t ) ,
where
f t =
1
Et
hR T
t ξt,sbsds
i.
Et

ξt,TFT

+ 1
with
Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds

= bt
exp

(µb   r  σbθ)(T   t)	  1
µb   r  σbθ
Et

ξt,TF

T

= φ1/γ 1(y) 1/γξ 1/γt e
 (1 1/γ)(r+θ2/2γ(T t).
Corollary 1 shows that under the simplifications contained in (A1)-(A3), the optimal
investment plan, expressed as a fraction of wealth allocated in risky assets, is a weighted
average of two quantities: the Merton’s solution (piM  (µ  r) /γσ2) and the ratio be-
tween the volatility of the benefit process and the risky asset (σb/σ). While the weighting
function ( f t ) is given by the fraction of optimal wealth,
Ft = Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds+ ξt,TF

T

,
that is accounted for the quantities in (6) and (7), respectively.
2.3.1 The benchmark portfolio
We introduce the benchmark portfolio, Y  fYt  0g0tT, against to which the perfor-
mance of the Unemployment Insurance Fund will be measured. The dynamics of this
benchmark is described by the system
(8)

dYt/Yt = (1  piY) rdt+ piY[(dSt + δdt) /St]  bYdt;
Y0 = F0; Yt  0, 8t 2 [0, T];
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where (piY, bY) 2 R [0, 1] denote the fraction (of total wealth) invested by the benchmark
in the risky asset, and the fraction that is paid as benefits, respectively. This last quantity
satisfies in addition the condition
(9) E0
Z T
0
ξtb
YYtdt+ ξTYT

= F0.
2.3.2 The incentives and the compensation scheme
In order to capture the main features of the compensation scheme faced by the Unem-
ployment Insurance Fund Manager, we introduce a stylized version of it that relates the
fund manager’s revenue with the difference in returns obtained by the Unemployment
Insurance Fund, RFT = ln(FT/F0), and the benchmark portfolio, R
Y
T = ln(YT/Y0), in the
following manner:
(10) φ =
8<:
φH if R
F
T  RYT + η + κ , R+
φM if R
F
T 2 [R ,R+)
φL if R
F
T < R
Y
T + η   κ , R 
where 1 > φH > φM > φL > 0, η 2 R denotes the predetermined component in the
computation of the annualized returns, and κ 2 [0, 1] stands for the excess in return that
triggers the increase or decrease in the base fee, φM. In order to simplify the analysis, we
have assumed that the difference in returns that triggers the bonus or penalty fee (φH and
φL, respectively) can be represented as a symmetric band of size κ > 0, around the base
return RYT + η.
Given the compensation scheme presented above, the time T fund manager’s revenue
is given by:
(11) φFT = φLFT1fRFT<R g + φMFT1fR RFT<R+g + φHFT1fRFTR+g,
where 1E corresponds to the indicator function of the event E 2 FT.
Remark 2 Note that the dynamics of the benchmark portfolio can be replicated by a combination
of B and S. That is, if we start from a neutral return base at the beginning of the month (η = 0),
and consider the initial position of both portfolios (F0 = Y0), and the amount of the expected
benefits, the fund manager has an admissible investment plan to track the benchmark portfolio as
close as desired.
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The optimization problem of the fund manager, in the presence of the compensation
scheme described in (10), can therefore be written as:
max
FT0
E0
h
u(φLFT1fRFT<R g + φMFT1fR RFT<R+g + φHFT1fRFTR+g)
i
,(P1)
subjet to: E0
Z T
0
ξtbtdt+ ξTFT

 F0.
A similar problem has been recently studied by Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro [1]. Themain
difference of problem (P0) with respect to previous studies is given by the presence of the
withdrawal process, b, and the particular compensation scheme under analysis. Our
results (Proposition 2 and Corollary 2), hence, follow closely the technique developed by
these authors.
As is well known (Basak et al.), the presence of compensation schemes such as the one
under analysis includes an additional difficulty with respect to standard portfolio choice
problems, which is given by the fact that the terminal payoff,
φFT = φLFT + (φH   φL)FT1fRFTR+g + (φM   φL)FT1fR RFT<R+g,
creates a local non-concavity in the objective function. This non-concavity causes in the
fund manager a “risk-loving” behavior in some subsets of the parameter space. This
additional complexity can nevertheless be address by employing ξT as a state variable.
By doing so we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider assumptions (A1)-(A3) and assume further that: (1) the quantities (φL,
φM, φH) are constant for any realization of ξT, and (2) that the parameter of the economy are such
that θ/piYσ > γ > 1. Then, the following expressions are local maximum of V(FT), for the
intervals of ξT that are indicated,
FH(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
H (y
ξT)
 1/γ for 0  ξT < ξH+
Fk+(ξT) , k+ (ξT) piYσ/θ for ξH  ξT < ξa
FM(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
M (y
ξT)
 1/γ for ξa  ξT  ξk 
Fk (ξT) , k  (ξT) piYσ/θ for (ξk  _ ξa) < ξT < ξb
FL(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
L (y
ξT)
 1/γ for ξb  ξT < ∞
where (a _ b) = max(a, b). The solution to the stochastic control problem (P1) is therefore given
by
FT = FH1f0ξT<ξHg + Fk+1fξHξT<ξag + FM1fξaξTξk g(12)
+Fk 1f(ξk _ξa)<ξT<ξbg + FL1fξbξT<∞g,
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with
ξH+ , (φ
1 1/γ
H (y
)1/γ k+)1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ), ξk  , (φ
1 1/γ
M (y
)1/γ k )1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ),
ξL , (φ
1 1/γ
L (y
)1/γ k )1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ),
where y is the value of the Lagrange multiplier for which the budget constraint holds with
equality, and the quantities (ξa, ξb, k
) are defined in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 illustrates the effects of the incentives embedded in the compensation
scheme under analysis, for the case where piM = (µ  r)/γσ2 > piY, i.e., when the bench-
mark portfolio allocates a smaller fraction in risky assets that the Merton’s solution; the
solution of the opposite case is provided in the Appendix [see Proposition A.3].
In the former case (i.e., constant φ), the desired value of the terminal fund (FT) was
a strictly decreasing function of the state-price ξT. Now, the fund manager is willing to
target a higher value than the one prescribed by the local conditions of optimality alone,
(13)
8<:
u0(φHFT ) = φ
 1
H y
ξT for RFT  R+
u0(φMFT ) = φ
 1
M y
ξT for RFT 2 [R ,R+)
u0(φLFT ) = φ
 1
L y
ξT for RFT < R
 .
This is due to the discontinuity in the compensation scheme faced by the fund manager.
As an illustration, consider the first two terms in (12). In the event fξT  ξHg, we have
that the terminal value of the fund prescribed by the local conditions in (13) is such that
FH(ξT)  Fk+(ξT). In such a case, by setting FH(ξT) as the optimal choice the manager
is not only being efficient in marginal terms (FH(ξT)  u0 1(φ 1H yξT)), but it is also
charging the high fee φH by doing so.
9 In contrast, for values of ξT in the range ξH <
ξT < ξa, the local conditions of optimality suggests the manager to reduce the desired
terminal level of the fund (i.e., FH(ξT) < Fk+(ξT)), but this would amount to give up the
incentive to increase its revenues (φH > φM). This is why the manager targets a terminal
fund (Fk+) that allows him to retain the revenue bonus (φH > φM) in a broader range of
events (f0  ξT < ξag) than those suggested by the local conditions in (13) alone (i.e.,
f0  ξT < ξHg).
As in the previous case, (Corollary 1), the identification of the desired level of the
terminal fund that the manager will pursue, FT , is enough to determine the investment
plan that finances this quantity. With regard to this, we have the following result.
9In the proof it is established the equivalency between the following events: fRFT  R+g  fFT  Fk+g.
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Corollary 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the optimal fraction invested in risky as-
sets is given by
(14)
pit
Ft
=
(µ  r)
γσ2
f 1t + (piY) f

2t +
σb
σ
(1  f 1t   f 2t ) 
1
σ
p
T   t g

t
where
f 1t = (A1ξ
 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+A3ξ
 1/γ
t

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+A5ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

)/Ft ,
f 2t = (A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+ A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )g

)/Ft ,
Ft = bt

exp

(µb   r  σbθ)(T   t)	  1
µb   r  σbθ + A1ξ
 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+ A3ξ
 1/γ
t

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )g

+ A5ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

,
gt = (Ft ) 1
n
A1ξ
 1/γ
t
 φ(e 1 )+ A2ξ piYσ/θt [φ(e+2 )  φ(e 2 )]
+A3ξ
 1/γ
t

φ(e+3 )  φ(e 3 )

1fΦ(e+3 )Φ(e 3 )g + A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

φ(e+4 )  φ(e 4 )

+ A5ξ
 1/γ
t φ(e
+
5 )
o
,
(Φ(), φ()) correspond to the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, respectively,
and the quantities (Ai, ei ), i = 1, . . . , 5, are defined in the Appendix.
From the expression in (14) it follows that the optimal investment plan has four com-
ponents: the Merton’s solution (piM), the investment policy of the benchmark portfolio
(piY), the ratio of volatilities (σb/σ), and a function that depends upon the indicator func-
tions associated to the expression for FT (g

t ). Depending on the configuration of para-
meters describing the economy, Basak et al. have shown that a fund manager subject to
a similar compensation scheme has incentives to increase the relative volatility between
pit /Ft and piY, motivated by the possibility of increasing revenues (φH   φM), when
the implicit option is “in-the-money” (RFt   RYt  η κ), or by the possibility of avoiding
a penalty (φM   φL), when the implicit option is “out-the-money” (RFt   RFt < η  κ); for
more details see Basak et al.
Since the realization of ξT is uncertain before time T, the effect of the incentives em-
bedded in the compensation schemewill depend upon the trajectory followed by ξ()(ω) :
[0, T] 7! [0,+∞). Hence, as long as the trajectory followed by ξ() assigns a relevant prob-
ability mass to the events fξH  ξT  ξag and f(ξk  _ ξa) < ξT < ξbg, the fund manager
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will be motivated to deviate its unconstrained investment plan towards the investment
plan piY.
In what follows we present the results of a numerical exercise aimed at clarifying the
most relevant aspects discussed until now. The figure below shows the optimal invest-
ment plan resulting from a trajectory of ξ() that arrives monotonically at a value ξT(ω0)
which is higher than ξb, which in turn makes FL the optimal choice [see Equation (12)].
The parameters have been chosen to magnify the effect that is being illustrated.10 To
simplify the analysis the figure considers a withdrawal/benefit process which is null at
all times.
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100
Time
%
 ri
sk
y 
as
se
t
The levels marked with the symbols “+” and “N” correspond to the Merton’s solution
(piM) and the investment plan of the benchmark portfolio (piY), respectively, while the
dashed line denotes the optimal choice of the fund manager characterized in Corollary 2.
10The parameters of the figure are as follows: piY = 0.85; r = 0.25; µ = 0.35; δ = 0; σ = 0.028; γ = 1.2;
F0 = 5; η = 0; κ = 0.1; φM = 0.05%; φH = 1.1φM; φL = 0.9φM. With these parameters one obtains ξH =
0.954; ξa = 9.27, ξb = 37.7. The trajectory corresponds to one where ∆Wti = 1.35, with i 2 f1, . . . , 100g.
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In the figure it is possible to see that the optimal investment plan has three peaks:
one that is located at the very beginning of the investment horizon, and two that are
located at the middle and near the end of the investment horizon. All of them can be
explained by the position of ξ()(ω0), and the quantities (ξH, ξa, ξb).11 In the case of the
first peak, the initial position of ξ0(= 1) is such that ξH < ξ0 < ξa. In this scenario
the fund manager faces a situation where the probabilities that the quantities FH and
Fk+ will become optimal at time T (conditional on F0) are 11% and 89%, respectively.
Additionally, the fund manager must obtain a return of 10% (κ = 0.1) in excess of the
benchmark portfolio in order to increase its revenue. The fund manager has therefore
the incentive to increase the volatility of its relative position (i.e., compared with the one
of the benchmark), which for the case where piM > piY can be attained by increasing the
holding of the risky asset (Basak et al.). Given the trajectory under consideration, Fk+ ends
up being optimal (almost surely) after the third period, and the fund manager optimally
decides to imitate the investment plan of the benchmark portfolio (piY) in order to obtain
the revenue bonus. This situation continues to be optimal until the trajectory of ξ() gets
closer to ξa, which gives rise to the second peak. At this point, the probabilities of Fk+
and Fk  of becoming optimal at time T (conditional on Ft) are 67% and 33%, respectively.
In this scenario the fund manager has once again the incentive to increase the relative
volatility of its position. This time though the bet does not pay off and the quantity Fk  ,
associated with a normal level of revenue (φM), ends up being optimal (almost surely)
after three periods. Under this new situation the fund manager optimally imitates the
investment plan of the benchmark portfolio, in this occasion not to increase its revenues,
but to avoid a punishment. As before, this situation continues to be optimal until the
trajectory of ξ() gets closer to ξb, which gives rise to the third peak. In this last case the
fundmanager battles to avoid a decrease in its revenue (φL). As in the previous cases, the
fund manager decides to increase the relative volatility of its position (Fk  and FL have
probabilities of becoming optimal at time T of 84% and 16%, respectively), but the bets
does not pay off either (FL becomes optimal {almost surely} after three periods), and a
reduction in revenues materializes with probability one. Given this, the fund manager
optimally decides to adopt its unconstrained optimal policy (Corollary 1), i.e., piM.
One element that deserves to be emphasized is the “risk-loving” behavior of the fund
manager. Even though Figure 1 was constructed with a value of γ relatively low (γ =
11Note that from the parameters we have that ξa > ξk  , and thus FM is never a part of the optimal
solution.
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1.2), it is possible to find high bets for small values of κ (closed to zero). This illustrates the
precaution that must be exercised by policy makers in the design of these compensation
schemes (for more examples in this line see Hodder and Jackwerth [11]).
3 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the implications of a compensation scheme with bench-
marking incentives. In line with the recent literature, we have shown the importance of
these incentives. In particular, depending on the parameters of the economy, the fund
manager will be motivated to imitate the portfolio policy of the benchmark portfolio to ei-
ther obtain a gain, or avoid a loss depending on the specifics of the compensation scheme.
Going beyond the theoretical implications of the admittedly stylized model that we
developed, there is a fact that should be of interest for policy makers regarding the newly
launched system in Chile. In particular, the analysis suggests that the investment policy
of the Unemployment Insurance Fund should to some extent be influenced by the nature
of the flow of benefits that are paid over the month. This probably amounts to allow the
investment in securities other than fixed-income alone. Given the high dependence of
the Chilean economy from the copper price it is reasonable to allow the Unemployment
Insurance Fund to hedge some of the business-cycle fluctuations through securities that
are correlated with such an asset.
The present study was conducted for an existing compensation scheme with an ex-
ogenously provided benchmark. The study of how to select an appropriate benchmark
is thus the next direction to pursue. Such an study will amount, in principle, to incorpo-
rate either the member’s preferences, or the fiscal authority’s interests.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From the dynamics in (1), and the definition of ξ in (3), an
application of Itô lemma delivers
Et

ξTFT +
Z T
0
ξtbtdt

 E0

ξTFT +
Z T
0
ξtbtdt

=
Z t
0
ξs [σspis   Fsθs] dWs.
Since the expression on the LHS is a martingale, there exists a process hs such that
Mt ,
Z t
0
ξs [σspis   Fsθs] dWs =
Z t
0
hsdWs.
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Equating terms we obtain
pit  Ft σ 1t θt + ξ 1t σ 1t ht ,
where we have made use of the fact that
Ft = Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds+ ξt,TF

T

corresponds to the optimal wealth process. That is, the process that finances the desired
terminal value of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, taking into account the payment
of future (uncertain) benefits.
Applying the Clark-Ocone (Ocone and Karatzas [17]) formula, it follows that
ht = Et
Z T
t
ξsbs
n
σbt   θt + Γt,s   Ht,s
o
ds 

ξTF

T fθt + Ht,Tg

1  1
γT

where
Ht,s ,
Z s
t
Dt(rv)dv+
Z s
t
Dt(θv)0θvdv+
Z s
t
Dt(θv)dWv

Γt,s ,
Z s
t
Dt(µbv)dv 
Z s
t
Dt(σbv)0σbvdv+
Z s
t
Dt(σbv)dWv

and Dt () is the Malliavin derivative operator.12
Proof of Corollary 1. From the definition of f t we have (bt,s = bs/bt)
f t =
φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T
i
btEt
hR T
t ξt,sbt,sds
i
+ φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T
i
For the numerator we can write
φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T
i
= φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
exp
n
  (1  1/γ)

[r+ θ2/2] (T   t) + θ[WT  Wt]
oi
= φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt exp
n
  (1  1/γ) (r+ θ2/2γ

(T   t)
o
12The Malliavin derivative operatior is an extension of the classical notion, that extends the concept to
functions of the trajectories ofW. In the same way that the classical derivative measures the local change in
the function, due to a local change in the underlying variable, the Malliavin derivative measures the change
in the function (that depends on the trajectories ofW) implied by a small change in the trajectory ofW. The
interested reader is referred to Detemple et al. [7] for a brief introduction to this operator, and to Nualart
[16] for a comprehensive treatment.
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while for the denominator we have
btEt
Z T
t
ξt,sbt,sds

+ φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T
i
= btEt
Z T
t

exp
n
µb   (r+ (θ2 + σ2b)/2)(s  t) + (σb   θ)(Ws  Wt)
o
ds

+φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
exp

(1  1/γ)

 (r+ θ2/2

(T   t)  θ[WT  Wt]
i
= bt
exp

(µb   r  σbθ)(T   t)	  1
µb   r  σbθ
+φ1/γ 1y 1/γξ 1/γt exp
n
  (1  1/γ)

r+ θ2/2γ

(T   t)
o
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the following set equalities:
fRFT ? Rg  fFT/F0 ? [YT/Y0] exp (η  κ)g  fFT ? k (ξT) piYσ/θ , Fk(ξT)g,
where the last equality follows from YT = A (ξT)
 piYσ/θ, with
k = F0 exp
h
r+ piYσ(θ/2  r/θ)  bY   pi2Yσ2/2
i
T + η  κ

,
A = F0 exp
h
r+ piYσθ   piYσ (r/θ + θ/2)  bY   pi2Yσ2/2
i
T

.
Then, we can re-write the expression in (11) as
φFT = φLFT1fFT<Fk g + φMFT1fFk FT<Fk+g + φHFT1fFTFk+g.
Now, consider the following quantities:
ξH+ ,

φ
1 1/γ
H y
1/γk+
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
, ξH  ,

φ
1 1/γ
H y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
,
ξk+ ,

φ
1 1/γ
M y
1/γk+
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
, ξk  ,

φ
1 1/γ
M y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
,
ξL ,

φ
1 1/γ
L y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
,
which correspond to the boundaries of the following intervals: fFH  Fk+g  fξT 
ξH+g, fFH  Fk g  fξT  ξH g, fFk   FM < Fk+g  fξk+ < ξT  ξk g, and
fFL < Fk g  fξT > ξLg, where y > 0 is a real number to be identified later on. For
the set of parameters under consideration (i.e., piYσ/θ   1/γ < 0 and 1/γ   1 < 0) it
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follows that ξH+ < ξH  < ξk+ < ξk  < ξL, and FH(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
H (yξT)
 1/γ < FM(ξT) ,
φ
1/γ 1
M (yξT)
 1/γ < FL(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
L (yξT)
 1/γ for any ξT.
Let
FT = FH1f0ξT<ξH+g + Fk+1fξH+ξT<ξag + FM1fξaξTξk g +Fk 1f(ξk _ξa)<ξT<ξbg
+FL1fξbξT<∞g,
be the solution of problem (P1). Then, for any FT that satisfies the static budget constraint
(2), FT must be such that the following condition holds (Basak et al. [1]),
E0 [v(FT , ξT)  v(FT, ξT)]  0,
where
v(FT, ξT) , u

φLFT1fFTFk g + φMFT1fFk <FT<Fk+g + φHFT1fFTFk+g

  yFTξT.
In order to show the optimality of FT we proceed to analyze the proposed solution for
different intervals of ξT. We notice before that
In the interval 0  ξT  ξH+ we have that Fk  < Fk+  FH < FM < FL, and therefore,
the bonus fee is obtained by setting FT 2 fFH, Fk+ , FM, FLg, in which case v(FT, ξT) =
u (φHFT)   yFTξT. It thus follows that FH is the global maximum in this case. In the
interval ξH+ < ξT  ξH  we have that Fk   FH < Fk+  FM < FL, and the bonus fee
is obtained by setting FT 2 fFk+ , FM, FLg. It thus follows by the concavity of v(, ξT) that
v(Fk+ , ξT) > v(FM, ξT) and so Fk+ is the global maximum in this case. The same logic
applies for the interval ξH  < ξT  ξk+ where FH < Fk  < Fk+  FM < FL, and so once
again, Fk+ is the global maximum in this case. In the interval ξk+ < ξT < ξk  we have that
FH < Fk  < FM < Fk+ < FL so that the bonus fee is obtained by setting FT 2 fFk+ , FLg.
In this case, however, the base fee (φM) is obtained by setting FT = FM. If Fk+ is to be
the global maximum in this interval (since FL is dominated, i.e., v(Fk+ , ξT) > v(FL, ξT)) it
must be true that v(Fk+ , ξT)  v(FM, ξT)  0. By inspection it follows that v(Fk+ , ξT) =
v(FM, ξT) + `a(ξT), where
(A.1) `a(ξ) ,
1
1  γ
24 (ξ)piYσ/θ
k+φH
!γ 1
  γ

yξ
φM
1 1/γ35  yk+ (ξ)1 piYσ/θ .
For the set of parameters under consideration, we have that `a(ξk+) > 0, `a(∞) =  ∞,
from where it follows that there is a value ξT = ξa, such that `a(ξa) = 0. Therefore,
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in the interval ξH+ < ξT < ξa Fk+ is the global maximum. If the set of parameters
is such that ξa < ξk  , it folows by the logic applied before in the case where FH was
the maximum that FM will be the global maximum in the interval ξa < ξT < ξk  . On
the other hand, if ξa > ξk  , FM will not be part of the optimal solution. For the next
interval, (ξk  _ ξa) < ξT  ξL, we have FM < Fk   FL. So FM cannot be the global
maximum either. In such interval Fk  is the global maximum. Now, if (ξa _ ξk ) < ξL
in the interval ξL < ξT < ∞, we have that Fk  < FL. In order to propose Fk  as the
global maximum it must be true that v(Fk  , ξT)  v(FL, ξT)  0. For this case we have
v(Fk  , ξT) = v(FL, ξT) + `b(ξT), where
(A.2) `b(ξ) ,
1
1  γ
24 (ξ)piYσ/θ
k φM
!γ 1
  γ

yξ
φL
1 1/γ35  yk  (ξ)1 piYσ/θ .
From the set of parameters under configuration, we have that `b(ξL) > 0. As in the case
above, there is a value ξT = ξb such that `b(ξb) = 0. So that in the interval ξL < ξT < ξb
Fk  is the global maximum. If ξa > ξL, we have that in the interval ξa < ξT < ξb Fk  is
the global maximum. Therefore, in the interval ξb  ξT < ∞ FL is the global maximum.
Finally, the real number y = y > 0 corresponds to the unique solution X (y) = F0,
where we have replaced FT , instead of F

T in (4).
Proof of Corollary 2. Since the indicator functions in the expression for Ft do not
belong to the domain of Dt(), we can alternatively determine pit from the volatility
component associated to
Ft = Et
Z T
t
ξt,sbsds+ ξt,TF

T

=
bt
µb   r  σbθ
h
exp
n
(µb   r  σbθ)(T   t)
o
  1
i
+A1ξ
 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+A3ξ
 1/γ
t

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+ A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

+A5ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

where the terms (Ai, ei ), i = 1, . . . , 5, are define below.
From the expression in (1) we have that dFt = [Ft   pit ]rdt+ pit [µdt+ σdWt] 
btdt, so that the expression next to the “dW” term, in the expression for dF, corre-
sponds to the term pit σ. An application of Itô’s rule delivers the expression (with
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∂2Ft /∂ξt∂bt = 0)
dFt = (∂Ft /∂t)dt+ (∂Ft /∂bt)dbt + (1/2)(∂2Ft /(∂b2t )dt+ (∂Ft /∂ξt)dξt
+(1/2)(∂2Ft /(∂ξ2t )dt,
and hence our interest is placed on the second and fourth term in this expression (i.e.,
those containing de “dW” components). Such terms are given by the following expres-
sions
∂Ft
∂bt
=
exp

(µb   r  σbθ)(T   t)	  1
µb   r  σbθ ,
∂Ft
∂ξt
=  (1/γ)A1ξ 1/γ 1t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ A1ξ
 1/γ
t
 φ(e 1 ) (ξtθpT   t) 1
  (piYσ/θ)A2ξ piYσ/θ 1t [Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

] + A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t [φ(e
+
2 )  φ(e 2 )](ξtθ
p
T   t) 1
  (1/γ)A3ξ 1/γ 1t

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+ A3ξ
 1/γ
t

φ(e+3 )  φ(e 3 )

1fΦ(e+3 )Φ(e 3 )g(ξtθ
p
T   t) 1
  (piYσ/θ)A4ξ piYσ/θ 1t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

+ A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

φ(e+4 )  φ(e 4 )

(ξtθ
p
T   t) 1
  A5(1/γ)ξ 1/γ 1t

Φ(e+5 )

+ A5ξ
 1/γ
t φ(e
+
5 )(ξtθ
p
T   t) 1,
while dξt =  ξt(rdt+ θdWt). Comparing terms we obtain
pit
Ft
=
1
σFt

σbbt
∂Ft
∂bt
  θξt
∂Ft
∂ξt

.
Plugging in the expressions for (∂Ft /∂ξt), (∂Ft /∂bt) and Ft we obtain equation (14):
pit
Ft
=
σb
σ
Et
hR T
t ξt,sbsds
i
Ft
+

µ  r
γσ2

ξ
 1/γ
t
Ft
 
A1

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ A3

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+ A5

Φ(e+5 )

+piY
ξ piYσ/θt
Ft
 
A2[Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

] + A4

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

  1
σ
p
T   tFt
n
A1ξ
 1/γ
t
 φ(e 1 )+ A2ξ piYσ/θt [φ(e+2 )  φ(e 2 )]
+A3ξ
 1/γ
t

φ(e+3 )  φ(e 3 )

1fΦ(e+3 )Φ(e 3 )g + A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

φ(e+4 )  φ(e 4 )

+ A5ξ
 1/γ
t φ(e
+
5 )
o
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In what follows we derive the second term in Et

ξt,TF

T

. The derivation of the
remaining terms follows identical steps and is left as a proposed exercise for the interest
reader.
Et
h
ξt,TFk+1fξHξT<ξag
i
= Et
h
ξt,T

(ξT)
 piYσ/θ

1fξHξT<ξag
i
= ξ piYσ/θt k
+Et
h 
ξt,T
1 piYσ/θ 1fξHξT<ξagi
= ξ piYσ/θt k
+Et
h
e (1 piYσ/θ)[(r+θ
2/2)(T t)+θ(WT Wt)]1fξHξT<ξag
i
From the equivalency of the events fξH  ξT < ξag and
fξH  ξte (r+θ
2/2)(T t) θ(WT Wt) < ξag
 fln(ξH/ξt) + (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)   θ (WT  Wt) < ln(ξa/ξt) + (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)g

(
d+2 ,
ln(ξt/ξH)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t  z >
ln(ξt/ξa)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t , d
 
2
)
where z s N (0, 1), it follows that the second term can be written as
ξ piYσ/θt k
+
Z
(d 2 ,d
+
2 ]
e(1 piYσ/θ)[( r θ
2/2)(T t) xθ
p
T t]

1p
2pi
e 
x2
2

dx
= A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
Z
(d 2 ,d
+
2 ]
1p
2pi
exp
(
 
 
x+ (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t2
2
)
dx
= A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
Z
(e 2 ,e
+
2 ]
1p
2pi
exp

 y
2
2

dy
= A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

where A2 = k+e (r+piYσ/2θ)(1 piYσ/θ)(T t), e2 , d2   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t, and the func-
tion Φ() corresponds to the c.d.f. of a standard normal variable.
Following analogous steps, it is possible to derive the remainder terms. After some
algebra, one obtains the expression
Et

ξt,TF

T

= A1ξ
 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+A3ξ
 1/γ
t

maxfΦ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 ), 0g

+ A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

+A5ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

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in the text, with
A1(t) = φ
1/γ 1
H (y
) 1/γe (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2,
A2(t) = k+e (r+piYσ/2θ)(1 piYσ/θ)(T t),
A3(t) = φ
1/γ 1
M (y
) 1/γe (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2,
A4(t) = k e (1 piYσ/θ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 piYσ/θ)2(T t)θ2/2,
A5(t) = φ
1/γ 1
L (y
) 1/γe (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2,
and (e 1 , e
 
2 , e
+
2 , e
 
3 , e
+
3 , e
 
4 , e
+
5 ) given by
e 1 =
ln(ξt/ξH)  (r+ θ2/2) (T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t
e 2 =
ln(ξt/ξa)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t
e+2 =
ln(ξt/ξH)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t
e 3 =
ln (ξt/ξk )  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t
e+3 =
ln (ξt/ξa)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t
e 4 =
ln (ξt/ξb)  (r+ θ2/2) (T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t
e+4 =
ln (ξt/fξa _ ξk g)  (r+ θ2/2) (T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t
e+5 =
ln (ξt/ξb)  (r+ θ2/2) (T   t)
θ
p
T   t   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t.
Proposition A.3. Consider assumptions (A1)-(A3) and assume further that: (1) the quantities
(φL, φM, φH) are constant for any realization of ξT, and (2) the parameters of the economy are
such that 1 < γ < θ/piYσ. Then, we have that the following expressions are local maxima of
V(FT), for the indicated intervals
FH(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
H (y
ξT)
 1/γ for ξH < ξT < ∞
Fk+(ξT) , k+ (ξT) piYσ/θ for ξc < ξT < ξH+
FM(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
M (y
ξT)
 1/γ for ξk   ξT  ξc
Fk (ξT) , k  (ξT) piYσ/θ for ξd < ξT  (ξk  _ ξc)
FL(ξT) , φ
1/γ 1
L (y
ξT)
 1/γ for 0  ξT  ξd
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The solution to problem (P1) is hence given by
FT = FH1fξH<ξT<∞g + Fk+1fξc<ξT<ξH+g + FM1fξk ξTξcg (A.3)
+Fk 1fξd<ξT(ξk _ξc)g + FL1f0ξTξdg,
where the constants (ξc, ξd) are identified in the proof.
Proof. The proof follows identical steps to those in the proof of Proposition 2. For
the set of parameters under consideration, in this occasion we have fFH  Fk+g  fξT 
ξHg, fFk   FM < Fk+g  fξk   ξT < ξk+g, and fFL < Fk g  fξT < ξLg. Likewise,
the following relations hold: ξH > ξk+ > ξk  > ξL, and FH < FM < FL.
Following the same logic, in the interval ξT > ξH we have v(FT, ξT) = u (φHFT)  
yFTξT, from where it follows that FH is the global maximum. In the interval ξk+ 
ξT < ξH, it follows that FH < Fk+  FM, so that FH cannot be the global maximum.
In this interval Fk+ is the global maximum. Next, in the interval ξk   ξT < ξk+ we
have that Fk   FM < Fk+ . As in the previous proof, in order to postulate Fk+ as the
global maximum it must be true that v(Fk+ , ξT)   v(FM, ξT)  0. From the expres-
sion v(Fk+ , ξT) = v(FM, ξT) + `c(ξT), where `c() , `a() behaves in the same manner
(`c(ξk+) > 0), we have that there is a value ξT = ξc, such that `c(ξc) = 0. Then, in the
interval ξc < ξT < ξH Fk+ is the global maximum. If we have ξc > ξk  , then FM is the
global maximum in the interval ξk   ξT < ξc. Otherwise, FM can never be the global
maximum (i.e., 1fξcξTξk g = 0, 8ω 2 Ω). Next, in the interval ξL  ξT  (ξc _ ξk )
we have that FM < Fk   FL. So that Fk  is the global maximum. Finally, in the in-
terval 0 < ξT < ξL we have that in order to postulated Fk  as the global maximum
in this interval, it must be true that v(Fk  , ξT)   v(FL, ξT)  0. For such a case we
have v(Fk  , ξT) = v(FL, ξT) + `d(ξT), where `d() , `b() behaves in the same manner
(`d(ξL) > 0), and as in the previous case, there is a value ξT = ξd, such that `d(ξd) = 0.
Hence, in the interval 0 < ξT  ξd FL is the global maximum.
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Derivación de los ξFi’s. Para ξF1 se tiene que
ξF1
= φ1/γ 1H y
 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
exp
n
  (1  1/γ)
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t) + θ (WT  Wt)
o
1fξT<ξHg
i
De la equivalencia
fξT < ξHg

n
e (r+θ
2/2)(T t) θ(WT Wt) < ξH/ξt
o

n
 (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)  θ(WT  Wt) < ln(ξH/ξt)
o

n
 zθpT   t < ln(ξH/ξt) +
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t)
o
 z >
ln(ξt/ξH) 
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t)
θ
p
T   t , d
 
1
se tiene que ξF1 puede expresarse como
φ
1/γ 1
H y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
( ∞,d+1 )
1
2pi
e (1 1/γ)([r+θ
2/2](T t)+xθ
p
T t) x2/2dx

= A1φ
1/γ 1
H y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
( ∞,d+1 )
1
2pi
exp
n
 (1  1/γ)2(T   t)θ2/2  (1  1/γ) xθpT   t  x2/2
o
dx

= A1φ
1/γ 1
H y
 1/γξ 1/γt
"Z
( ∞,d+1 )
1
2pi
exp
(
 
 
x+ (1  1/γ) θpT   t2
2
)
dx
#
= A1φ
1/γ 1
H y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
( ∞,e+1 )
1
2pi
exp

 1
2
y2

dy

= A1φ
1/γ 1
H y
 1/γξ 1/γt

1 Φ(e+1 ) + φ(e+1 )

en donde A1 = e (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2, e+1 = d
+
1   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t.
Para ξF3 se tiene que
ξF3
= Et
h
ξt,TFM1fξaξTξk g
i
= φ1/γ 1M y
 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T 1fξaξTξk g
i
= φ1/γ 1M y
 1/γξ 1/γt Et
h
exp
n
  (1  1/γ)
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t) + θ (WT  Wt)
o
1fξaξTξk g
i
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De la equivalencia
fξa  ξT  ξk g
 f(ξa/ξt)  e (r+θ
2/2)(T t) θ(WT Wt)  (ξk /ξt)g

(
d+3 ,
ln (ξt/ξa)  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t  z 
ln (ξt/ξk )  (r+ θ2/2)(T   t)
θ
p
T   t , d
 
3
)
se tiene que ξF3 puede expresarse como
φ
1/γ 1
M y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
[d 3 ,d
+
3 ]
e (1 1/γ)([r+θ
2/2](T t)+xθ
p
T t)

1
2pi
e x
2/2

dx

= φ1/γ 1M y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
[d 3 ,d
+
3 ]
1
2pi
e (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t) (1 1/γ)xθ
p
T t x2/2dx

= A3φ
1/γ 1
M y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
[d 3 ,d
+
3 ]
1
2pi
e (1 1/γ)
2(T t)θ2/2 (1 1/γ)xθpT t x2/2dx

= A3φ
1/γ 1
M y
 1/γξ 1/γt
"Z
[d 3 ,d
+
3 ]
1
2pi
exp
(
 
 
x+ (1  1/γ) θpT   t2
2
)
dx
#
= A3φ
1/γ 1
M y
 1/γξ 1/γt
Z
[e 3 ,e
+
3 ]
1
2pi
exp

 y
2
2

dy

= A3φ
1/γ 1
M y
 1/γξ 1/γt

Φ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 )

en donde A3 = e (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2, e3 = d

3   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t.
Para ξF4 se tiene que
Et
h
ξt,TFk 1fξk <ξT<ξbg
i
= k ξ piYσ/θt Et
h
ξ1 piYσ/θt,T 1fξk <ξT<ξbg
i
= k ξ piYσ/θt Et
h
ξ1 piYσ/θt,T exp
n
  (1  piYσ/θ)
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t) + θ (WT  Wt)
o
1fξk <ξT<ξbg
i
De la equivalencia
fξk  < ξT < ξbg

8<:d+4 , ln (ξt/ξk ) 
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t)
θ
p
T   t > z >
ln (ξt/ξb) 
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t)
θ
p
T   t , d
 
4
9=;
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se tiene que ξF4 puede expresarse como
A4k ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
Z
(d 4 ,d
+
4 )
1
2pi
e (1 piYσ/θ)
2(T t)θ2/2 (1 piYσ/θ)xθ
p
T t x2/2dx

= A4k ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
"Z
(d 4 ,d
+
4 )
1
2pi
exp
(
 
 
x+ (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t2
2
)
dx
#
= A4k ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
Z
(e 4 ,e
+
4 )
1
2pi
exp

 y
2
2

dy

= A4k ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 )  φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 ) + φ(e 4 )

en donde A4 = e (1 piYσ/θ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 piYσ/θ)2(T t)θ2/2, e4 = d

4   (1  piYσ/θ) θ
p
T   t.
Para ξF5 se tiene que
Et
h
ξt,TFL1fξTξbg
i
= φ1/γ 1L ξ
 1/γ
t Et
h
ξ
1 1/γ
t,T 1fξTξbg
i
= φ1/γ 1L ξ
 1/γ
t Et
h
exp
n
  (1  1/γ)
h
r+ θ2/2
i
(T   t) + θ (WT  Wt)
o
1fξTξbg
i
De la equivalencia
fξT  ξbg

n
exp
n
 

r+ θ2/2

(T   t)  θ (WT  Wt)
o
 ξb/ξt
o

8<:z  ln (ξt/ξb) 

r+ θ2/2

(T   t)
θ
p
T   t , d
+
5
9=;
se tiene que ξF5 puede expresarse como
φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t
Z
( ∞,d+5 ]
1
2pi
e (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t) (1 1/γ)xθ
p
T t x2/2dx

= A5φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t
Z
( ∞,d+5 ]
1
2pi
e (1 1/γ)
2(T t)θ2/2 (1 1/γ)xθpT t x2/2dx

= A5φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t
Z
( ∞,d+5 ]
1
2pi
exp
n
  (1  1/γ)2 (T   t) θ2/2  (1  1/γ) xθpT   t  x2/2
o
dx

= A5φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t
"Z
( ∞,d+5 ]
1
2pi
exp
(
 
 
x+ (1  1/γ) θpT   t2
2
)
dx
#
= A5φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t
Z
( ∞,e+5 ]
1
2pi
exp

 1
2
y2

dx

= A5φ
1/γ 1
L ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

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en donde A5 = e (1 1/γ)[r+θ
2/2](T t)+(1 1/γ)2(T t)θ2/2, e+5 = d
+
5   (1  1/γ) θ
p
T   t.
Derivación de pi. Una vez singularizado el proceso fFt ; t 2 [0, T]g, podemos
identificar la volatilidad de dFt mediante una aplicación del lema de Itô. El componente
asociado a la volatilidad está dado por
pit σ = (∂Ft /∂bt)(btσb) + (∂Ft /∂ξt)( ξtθ).
Para el término ∂Ft /∂bt tenemos
e(µ
b r σbθ)(T t)   1
µb   r  σbθ .
En tanto que para el término ∂Ft /∂ξt tenemos
A1( 1/γ)ξ 1/γt
n
ξ 1t

1 Φ(e 1 ) + φ(e 1 )
  (∂Φ(e 1 )/∂ξt) + (∂φ(e 1 )/∂ξt)o
+A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
n
ξ 1t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+ φ(e 2 )

+ ∂(Φ(e+2 )/∂ξt)  (∂Φ
 
e 2

/∂ξt) + (∂φ(e
 
2 )/∂ξt)
o
+A3ξ
 1/γ
t
n
ξ 1t
h 
Φ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 )
+i
+
 
(∂Φ(e+3 )/∂ξt)  (∂Φ(e 3 )/∂ξt)
+o
+A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t
n
ξ 1t

Φ(e+4 )  φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 ) + φ(e 4 )

+ (∂Φ(e+4 )/∂ξt)
  (∂φ(e+4 )/∂ξt)  (∂Φ(e 4 )/∂ξt) + (∂φ(e 4 )/∂ξt)
	
+ A5ξ
 1/γ
t
n
ξ 1t Φ(e
+
5 ) + (∂Φ(e
+
5 )/∂ξt)
o
en donde
Φ(y(x)) =
1p
2pi
Z y(x)
 ∞
e s
2/2ds
∂Φ(y(x))
∂x
=
1p
2pi
e y(x)
2/2  ( y(x))  y0(x)
∂φ(y(x))
∂x
=
1p
2pi
e y(x)
2/2  ( y(x))  y0(x)
Proposition 3 n
Corollary 3
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`a(ξ) ,
1
γ  1
24γ yξ
φM
1 1/γ
 
 
(ξ)piYσ/θ
k+φH
!γ 135  yk+ (ξ)1 piYσ/θ
∂`a/∂ξ =

y
φM
1 1/γ
ξ 1/γ  

1
k+φH
γ 1
(γ  1) (piYσ/θ) ξ(γ 1)(piYσ/θ) 1
 yk+(1  (piYσ/θ))ξ piYσ/θ
`b(ξ) ,
1
γ  1
24γ yξ
φL
1 1/γ
 
 
(ξ)piYσ/θ
k φM
!1 γ35  yk  (ξ)1 piYσ/θ .
Parámetros
k , F0 exp
 
r+ piYσ(θ/2  r/θ)  bY   pi2Yσ2/2

T + η  κ
.1 Basak’s derivation
Sea
Wt = [N(d(γM, ξˆ)) f
(1/γM 1
H + N( d(γM, ξa) f
(1/γ; 1)
L ]Z(γM)(yξt)
 1/γM
+[N(d(κ, ξa))  N((d(κ, ξˆ))]AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt
θˆtWt = WtθN + [N(d(κ, ξa))  N(d(κ, ξˆ))](γM/κ   1)AθNZ(κ)ξ 1/κt
+f[φ(d(κ, ξa))  φ(d(κ, ξˆ))]AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt
+[φ(d(γM, ξˆ)) f
(1/γM 1)
H   φ(d(γM, ξa)) f (1/γM 1)L ]Z(γM)(yξt) 1/γMg
 γMθ
N
κ
p
T   t
La derivada deWt está dada por
 ∂W

t
∂ξt
ξtθ/σ
Wt
= (θ/γσ)
h
N(d(γM, ξˆ)) f
(1/γM 1
H + N( d(γM, ξa) f
(1/γ; 1)
L
i
Z(γM)(yξt)
 1/γM/Wt
+(θ/γσ)
h
(1+ γ/κ   1) N(d(κ, ξa))  N((d(κ, ξˆ))] AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt i /Wt
+(θ/σ)
h
φ(d(γM, ξˆ)) f
(1/γM 1)
H + φ( d(γM, ξa) f
(1/γ; 1)
L
i
Z(γM)(yξt)
 1/γM(Wt κ
p
T   t) 1
+(θ/σ)[φ(d(κ, ξa))  φ((d(κ, ξˆ))]AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt (Wt κ
p
T   t) 1
= (θ/γσ) +
h
(θ/γσ)(γ/κ   1) N(d(κ, ξa))  N((d(κ, ξˆ))] AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt i /Wt
+(Wt κ
p
T   t) 1(θ/σ)f
h
φ(d(γM, ξˆ)) f
(1/γM 1)
H + φ( d(γM, ξa) f
(1/γ; 1)
L
i
Z(γM)(yξt)
 1/γM
+[φ(d(κ, ξa))  φ((d(κ, ξˆ))]AZ(κ)ξ 1/κt g
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Supongamos que b0 = 0. Entonces tenemos que
Ft = A1ξ
 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ A2ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+A3ξ
 1/γ
t
h 
Φ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 )
+i
+ A4ξ
 piYσ/θ
t

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

+A5ξ
 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

Definimos los procesos RFt = ln(F

t /F0) y R
Y
t = ln(Yt/Y0). La pregunta relevante es si la
cantidad RFt   RYt es monótona en ξt, de manera de poder graficar pit como función de
RFt   RYt . Para esta expresión tenemos que RFt   RYt = ln(Ft /Yt). De la demostración de
la Proposición 2 se tiene que Yt = A(ξt)
 piYσ/θ. Luego, podemos escribir
RFt   RYt = ln

(A1/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ
t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+ (A2/A)

Φ(e+2 ) Φ
 
e 2

+(A3/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ
t
h 
Φ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 )
+i
+ (A4/A)

Φ(e+4 ) Φ(e 4 )

+ (A5/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ
t

Φ(e+5 )

.
La derivada de esta expresión, con respecto a ξt, está dada por
Yt
Ft


(A1/A)(piYσ/θ   1/γ)ξpiYσ/θ 1/γ 1t

1 Φ(e 1 )

+(A1/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ 1
t [ φ(e1)](1/(θ
p
T   t))
+1fΦ(e+2 )Φ(e 2 )g(A2/A)

φ(e+2 )  φ
 
e 2

(1/(θ
p
T   t))
+(A3/A)(piYσ/θ   1/γ)ξpiYσ/θ 1/γ 1t
h 
Φ(e+3 ) Φ(e 3 )
+i
+1fΦ(e+3 )Φ(e 3 )g(A3/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ 1
t

φ(e+3 )  φ(e 3 )

(1/(θ
p
T   t))
+1fΦ(e+4 )Φ(e 4 )g(A4/A)

φ(e+4 )  φ(e 4 )

(1/(θ
p
T   t))
+(A5/A)(piYσ/θ   1/γ)ξpiYσ/θ 1/γ 1t

Φ(e+5 )

+ (A5/A)ξ
piYσ/θ 1/γ 1
t

φ(e+5 )

(1/(θ
p
T   t))

Para el caso de los términos que contienen la funciónΦ() el signo de la expresión está
dado por el término piYσ/θ   1/γ.
Notes on the proof of Propoposition 2.
In the interval ξT  ξH+ we have Fk  < Fk+  FH < FM < FL
In the interval ξH+ < ξT  ξH  we have Fk   FH < Fk+ < FM < FL
In the interval ξH  < ξT  ξk+ we have FH < Fk  < Fk+  FM < FL
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In the interval ξk+ < ξT  ξk  we have that FH < Fk   FM < Fk+ < FL
In the interval (ξk  _ ξa) < ξT  ξL we have FH < FM < Fk  < Fk+ < FL
we also need to know the relationship between
ξT <

φ
1 1/γ
H y
1/γk+
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
= ξH+
ξT <

φ
1 1/γ
H y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
= ξH 
ξT <

φ
1 1/γ
M y
1/γk+
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
= ξk+
ξT <

φ
1 1/γ
M y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
= ξk 
ξT <

φ
1 1/γ
L y
1/γk 
1/(piYσ/θ 1/γ)
= ξL
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